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THE OFFICIAL RECORDS EXCEPTION
TO THE HEARSAY RULE
IN CALIFORNIA
John J. Duttont
The rule excluding hearsay evidence is well known.1 Equally
well known is the rule that an official record may be admitted into
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.2 California Code of
Civil Procedure Sections 19208 and 19261 purport to set forth the
doctrine, but as stated in Chandler v. Hibberd,5 "it has been re-
peatedly held that those sections cannot have literal application." 6
The courts in interpreting these sections have provided for additional
requirements to ensure trustworthiness.
However, with the advent of the new Evidence Code in Cali-
fornia8 it seems that evidence statutes will probably be more closely
followed. The question now presented is whether section 1280 of
that code, which contains the official records exception, has codified
existing law or provided a new standard of admissibility. Section
1280 of the California Evidence Code provides:
t A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, University of California at Berkeley; Member, Order
of the Coif; Former attorney, California State Judicial Council; Lecturer in Law,
University of Santa Clara School of Law; Judge, Santa Clara-Cupertino Municipal
Court.
I CAL. Evm. COnE § 1200 (a). This new statute adopts the standard definition of
hearsay: "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."
See People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964), for a
recent discussion of the present California hearsay rule and its various exceptions.
2 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1638a (3d ed. 1940); McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 291
(1954).
3 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1920: ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL BOOKS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE.
Entries in public or other official books or records, made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of this state, or by another person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein.
4 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1926: ENTRIES MADE BY OFFICERS OR BOARDS PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE. An entry made by an officer, or board of officers, or under the direction and
in the presence of either, in the course of official duty, is prima facie evidence of the
facts stated in such entry.
5 165 Cal. App. 2d 39, 332 P.2d 133 (1958).
6 Id. at 65, 332 P.2d at 149.
7 Behr v. County of Santa Cruz, 172 Cal. App. 2d 697, 342 P.2d 987 (1959);
Hoel v. City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal. App. 2d 295, 288 P.2d 989 (1955).
8 The new California Evidence Code was adopted by the Legislature in 1965 and
will become effective January 1, 1967. The code was proposed by the California Law
Revision Commission after years of research and study. The final product, which
is based on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and present California law, contains a
number of reforms and changes in the rules of evidence.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event
is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove
the act, condition or event if:
(a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of
a public employee;
(b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, con-
dition or event; and
(c) The sources of information and method and time of prepara-
tion were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.
An examination of the language of the section does not supply a
ready answer to the question as to what extent the present rule will
be changed.
SUBSECTION (a) WRITING BY AND WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
DUTY OF A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
Subsection (a) of section 1280 makes it clear that any public
employee can make the writing. The present California law is un-
certain on this point: the question of how much emphasis will be
placed on the making of the record by a public officer as opposed to
an employee or private person has not been discussed in the Cali-
fornia cases.
In the federal cases it seems to be established that a record
made by a subordinate or employee of a public agency will be
considered within the official records exception, at least where it is
made under the public officer's direction.9 There are even some
federal cases indicating that a report made by a private person and
filed with a public agency or made a part of the agency's records
may be admitted into evidence as an official record if a statute re-
quires the report.10 Whether such records would presently be
9 Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1878). In this case plaintiff school teacher
fell through a hole in the planked covering of a city improved drainage ditch. To show
absence of contributory negligence, she alleged that the hole was covered by snow and
sought to introduce records of the United States Signal Service to show a snow stormjust prior to the accident. The defendant city objected contending there was no law
authorizing the record to be used in evidence. The Supreme Court approved the
admission because the records were kept in the discharge of a public duty and stated,
"nor need they be kept by a public officer himself, if the entries are made under his
direction by a person authorized by him." Accord, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 1 F.R.D. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
10 Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Moran Towing and Transp. Co., 196 F.2d 1002,
1005 (2d Cir. 1952), where a letter to the Coast Guard, written by one of the wit-
nesses, was offered in evidence to discredit the oral testimony of the writer. The court
disapproved the denial of admission citing the regulation which required the rendering
of a report in these circumstances and calling the letter an official document, stating:
"... this official record doctrine ordinarily applies to reports made by persons who are
themselves public officials and not to private persons charged by law with a duty to
report. Moreover, the decisions are not altogether uniform that reports of private
persons are within the rule. However, there is substantial support for saying that they
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admitted in California cannot be answered with any degree of
certainty. Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1920 and 1926 are prob-
ably broad enough to admit both types of records in evidence, 1 and
there are cases which appear to permit such evidence without
specifically discussing the problem. 2 Indeed, there seems to be no
good reason for excluding records prepared by a subordinate or
employee of an agency.' 8 There may be more of a question, however,
whether reports of a private person incorporated into public records
should be admitted. 4 In such a case there would appear to be less
guarantee of accuracy than in official records routinely made by a
public agency. Moreover, in most cases it would be inconsistent with
the requirement, discussed below, that the official or his subordinates
must have first-hand knowledge of the facts recorded.
are, and this accords with the modern acceptance of reports made in the due course of
business." Accord, Desimone v. United States, 227 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1955) (quarterly
income tax return); M'Inerney v. United States, 143 Fed. 729 (Ist Cir. 1906) (ship
manifest).
Contra, Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954), involved
alleged income tax evasion. The government introduced a file from the Public Welfare
Department containing forms completed by defendant's mother-in-law, an affidavit by
defendant's wife, reports of department investigators and reports from several banks.
This information tended to show that the mother in law could not have made a pur-
ported gift to the defendant. The court held that the report should have been excluded
and further stated: ". . . this circuit and most of the other circuits which have passed
on the question have held that the facts stated in the documents must have been
within the personal knowledge and observation of the recording official or his subordi-
nates . . . ." Accord, Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Wong
Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1952).
11 The language of the sections, "by another person in performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law" (§ 1920), and "or under the direction and in the presence
of either" (§ 1926), seems to allow sufficient latitude for the admissibility of such
reports.
12 Ames v. Empire Star Mines Co., 17 Cal. 2d 213, 110 P.2d 13 (1941); Nilsson
v. State Personnel Board, 25 Cal. App. 2d 699, 78 P.2d 467 (1938). In the case of
Daves Market, Inc. v. Dept. Alcoholic Beverage Control, 222 Cal. App. 2d 671, 35
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1963), fair trade contracts which were probably filed by private
persons were admitted into evidence as official records. It would seem that the signifi-
cant fact in this case was the filing of the contracts themselves; that is, the records
were not being offered to prove observations by private persons. Perhaps under these
circumstances there is a sufficient probability of truth and accuracy of the records so
that they should be admitted.
18 See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 291 (1954).
14 See People v. Lessard, 58 Cal. 2d 447, 375 P.2d 46, 25 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1962),
where transcript of witnesses' testimony at coroner's inquest was offered by defendant,
the Supreme Court sustained the rejection on the basis that it was not a public record.
But see Orange County Water District v. City of Riverside, 173 Cal. App. 2d 137,
182, 343 P.2d 450, 475 (195 ) where the Court of Appeals sustained the admission of a
tabulation of individual property owners' reports (in part required by the regulations
of the Water District) which included the use of the water. The court stated, "We
think, then, that, although in some sort hearsay, these very numerous statements, had
they been brought into court, would have been admissible (Code Civ. Proc., § 1920),
and that, in the absence of any demand that they be produced, the summary from
them compiled by the district was properly admitted for what it was worth."
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A related question in determining whether a document is an
official record is: how strict will the courts be in requiring that there
be a duty to keep the particular record? Is it necessary that a
statute specifically require that the record be kept, or is it sufficient
merely that the record be one that is usually and customarily kept
by the agency? The language in some of the cases implies that there
must be a statute specifically requiring the particular record. 5 A
recent example of this view is found in the case of Roberts v.
Permanente Corp.,16 where the plaintiff sought damages for injury
to property from the operation of the defendant's cement plant. The
decision for the defendant was reversed because of prejudicial error
in jury instructions. But the court specifically discussed and found
error in the admission of a report authenticated by the clerk of the
Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara County. The report, entitled
"Study, San Antonio Hills, Inc., Air Pollution Complaint 1955-
1956," was made by the Santa Clara County Air Pollution Control
District. It reviewed the operations of the cement plant and also a
nearby quarry and contained statements of opinion and conclusions
as to the greater probability of property damage in the area being
caused by the quarry dust. In rather strong terms, the court
indicated that the report should have been excluded.
... [T]he records must be made by an official pursuant to govern-
mental duty. [Citations omitted.] The record is devoid of any evi-
dence which indicates it was the duty of the County Health Depart-
ment to investigate such alleged air pollution, or more important,
record its findings pursuant to investigation . . . . Finding no duty
on the agency to investigate or make this report, we conclude that it
is not a public record within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure,
section 1920, and its introduction into evidence was error. 17
But those cases which have found no duty to make the record,
have also involved the recording of matters upon which the official
could not have given oral testimony if he had been present on the
witness stand and the record could have been excluded upon that
ground. The official lacked either first-hand knowledge of the facts
or recorded opinions and conclusions. There are cases, however,
where the official making the record quite obviously is not doing so
in the regular course of official duty, and the documents should not
be considered official records.' On the other hand, in the cases where
15 Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961);
Reisman v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 123 Cal. App. 2d 493, 267 P.2d 36 (1954);
City of Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal. App. 369, 244 Pac. 609 (1926). See Ogilvie v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co., 189 Cal. 406 (1922).
16 188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
17 Id. at 533, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
18 Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 257 P.2d 690 (1953). See City of Los
Angeles v. Watterson, 8 Cal. App. 2d 331, 48 P.2d 87 (1935), where the lower court
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it appears that it is the usual type of record that should be kept by
such an agency, no great emphasis is placed on the question.' 9
The new Evidence Code appears to definitively settle the ques-
tion of who must make the record, and is therefore, in a sense, an
extension of present California law. However, there is no reason to
believe that the code is a departure from present California law on
the question of duty to make the record.
SUBSECTION (b) WRITING MADE AT OR NEAR THE TIME OF ACT
The source and reason for this requirement, that the writing be
made at or near the time of the act, is uncertain.2" Other exceptions
to the hearsay rule such as the business records exception 2' include
this criterion, but there is no discussion in the California cases of
such a requirement for official records. It may have been adopted
from the business records exception22 for purposes of uniformity
since most, if not all, official documents are also within the scope of
that exception.2" On the other hand, it may be that the draftsmen
of the new code were concerned about evidence manufactured for
litigation and sought by this subsection to exclude such evidence.
Two cases may serve to illustrate this point. In Reisman v. Los
Angeles City School District,24 a child died as the result of a fall on
an asphalt playground at school. A report indicating the comparative
safety of asphalt playgrounds in Los Angeles Schools was admitted.
was sustained in its refusal to admit a letter from a state engineer to the Governor
concerning the matters in controversy.
19 Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Con. Appeals Bd., 212 Cal. App. 2d 106, 28 Cal. Rptr.
74 (1963).
20 The comments of the California Law Revision Commission shed very little
light on the matter.
21 California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1953(f) states: "a record of an act,
condition or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian
or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and
if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condi-
tion or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method
and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."
22 CAL. EviD. CODE § 1271. "Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act,
condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove
the act, condition, or event if:
"(a) The writing was made in the regular course of business;
"(b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event;"
[subsections (c) and (d) omitted].
23 Nichols v. McCoy, 38 Cal. 2d 447, 240 P.2d 569 (1952); McLean v. City and
County of S.F., 151 Cal. App. 2d 133, 311 P.2d 158 (1957); Fox v. San Francisco,
Unified School Dist., Ill Cal. App. 2d 885, 245 P.2d 603 (1952); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 1953(e) and § 1953(f). See DeHart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 161 P.2d 453 (1945) ;
Comments of the California Law Revision Commission to California Evidence Code
sections 1270 and 1280.
24 123 Cal. App. 2d 493, 267 P.2d 36 (1954).
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The report, though covering a twenty-year span of statistics, was not
compiled until after the claim for damages was presented. The school
district sought to sustain the report as an official record, but the
court rejected it as containing numerous opinions, arguments and
statements of purported facts which would not have been admissible
as oral testimony. Similarly, in Roberts v. Permanente Corp.,25 the
original action was brought by the plaintiff in December 1954.
However 'the "study" of the Air Pollution Control District was for
the period 1955-1956. The admission of this record was also called
error and the reason given was the lack of duty to make the investi--
gation or prepare the report. Nevertheless, the fact that the record
was prepared subsequent to the litigation may have been of concern
to the court.
It can be seen that the evidence in these cases could be
excluded under subsection (c) of section 1280 thereby rendering
the use of subsection (b) superfluous. Moreover, this additional
restriction as to time may bring an inflexibility to the official records
rule which will be both undesirable and unnecessary. This is
particularly so in light of subsection (c) which requires that the
time of preparation of the document must be such as to indicate its
trustworthiness.
SUBSECTION (c) SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND METHOD AND
TIME OF PREPARATION MUST INDICATE TRUSTWORTHINESS
The comment by the Law Revision Commission to Evidence
Code Section 1280 seems to indicate that the present law as to trust-
worthiness of the document will be continued. The present California
law, established by the cases, is that the record will be admitted
only if the official or other person making the record could testify
to the same effect if he were on the stand.26 This proposition gen-
erally involves two specific requirements. The official must have
first-hand knowledge,27 and the evidence must not amount to state-
25 Supra note 16.
26 Behr v. County of Santa Cruz, supra note 7; Hoel v. City of Los Angeles,
supra note 7; Reisman v. Los Angeles City School Dist., supra note 24; Harrigan v.
Chaperon, 118 Cal. App. 2d 167, 257 P.2d 716 (1953); McGowan v. City of Los
Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 386, 223 P.2d 862 (1950); City of Los Angeles v. Watter-
son, supra note 18; MCCORMICK, EVmENCE § 291 and § 293 (1954); WrrKIN, CALi-
PoRNiA EVIDENcE § 296 (1958).
27 McGowan v. City of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 2d 386, 223 P.2d 862 (1950),
involved an intersection accident with a police car. A county coroner's report on the
results of a blood alcohol test, on blood contained in a bottle labeled with the name
of the dead driver, was denied admission. The coroner's office did not have first hand
knowledge that the blood tested had come from the body of the driver. The court
stated: "if it had been proved that the blood analyzed by the county coroner's office
had been taken from the body of Cox before any extraneous matter had been injected
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ments of opinion and conclusion to which the person could not testify
in court.28 The same criteria are generally applied in -the related
area of business records. However, in that area two cases have sug-
gested that first-hand knowledge is not essential to admissibility.29
But the statement in both opinions does not appear to be a signifi-
cant part of the case. In a third case, Ames v. Empire Star Mines
Co.,8 ° documents which the court accepted as official records seemed
to contain information of which the public official or his subordinate
would not have had first-hand knowledge. This case, however, in-
volved ancient mining claims which could not be proved in any other
way, and should probably be restricted to its facts. Apart from these
three cases, the weight of authority in California properly requires
first-hand knowledge on the part of the persons in the public agency
who made the record.5 0 Similarly, the cases hold that statements of
opinion and conclusion in official records should not be admitted into
evidence." It has been suggested that the opinion rule should be
relaxed for statements in official records.8 2 On the contrary, it seems
into his body, the coroner's record of the analysis would have been admissible and
prima fade evidence of the facts therein stated." Supra at 389, 223 P.2d at 864.
Further, in quoting Wigmore, the court said: ". . . for matters not occurring in the
presence of the officer, his record or certificate is inadmissible, not only because in
general a witness must have personal knowledge, but also because an officer's duty is
usually concerned only with matters done by or before him." Supra at 391, 223 P.2d
at 865.
28 Reisman v. Los Angeles City School Dist., supra note 24; Pruett v. Burr, supra
note 18; Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal. App. 506, 2 P.2d 870 (1931). In the case of
People v. Terrell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 35, 291 P.2d 155 (1955), a business records case,
the court held that a statement in the hospital record, of the doctor's diagnosis
of criminal abortion, was an opinion that could not be testified to by the doctor
in person and therefore could not be admitted. However, it was made clear in
People v. Williams, 174 Cal. App. 2d 364, 345 P.2d 47 (1959), that the usual
medical conclusions to which a doctor may testify can be admitted into evidence
as an official record. But see California Law Revision Commission Study relating to
Uniform Rules of Evidence at 328 (1962).
29 In Nichols v. McCoy, supra note 23, the question was whether the blood
analysed was that of the decedent. Apart from the label on the sample of the blood,
there was independent evidence that the deceased was the only body in the mortuary
at the time the blood was withdrawn. The issue, therefore, seemed to be more of a
problem involving the chain of evidence rather than the first-hand knowledge of the
official analyzing the blood. Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. 2d 600, 608-9, 145 P.2d 1, 5
(1944), in a dictum, contains the following statement: "it is the object of the busi-
ness records statutes to eliminate the necessity of calling each witness, and to
substitute the record of the transaction or event. It is not necessary that the person
making the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction." The court probably
meant only to indicate that if someone else in the business, who reported the in-
formation in the regular course of business, had personal knowledge, that would be
sufficient.
30 17 Cal. 2d 213, 110 P.2d 13 (1941).
3oa WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 296 (1958); cases cited in notes 26 and
27 supra.
31 See cases cited notes 26 and 28 supra.
32 McComincxIC, EVIDENCE § 18 (1954).
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the rule should be at least as strict, in view of the fact that there is
no opportunity for cross examination to test the basis for the
opinion. 8 Nevertheless, the new code may allow such statements
since none of the language of section 1280 covers the matter. It
could be argued that opinions are included in "method of . . . prep-
aration,, a a but this would seem to be a rather strained construction.
FOUNDATION REQUIREMENT
Exactly what evidence is necessary to lay a foundation for the
admissibility of an official record cannot be stated with certainty. It
seems clear that there must be some evidence that the document was
kept in the regular course of official duty, 4 and that it is not suffi-
cient merely to have a person from the public agency testify that the
document is a public record. 8 But where a certified copy of an
official record is offered, the certification establishes the authenticity
of the document,86 and perhaps it can be admitted in evidence with-
out further foundation if, from the face of the writing itself, it is
apparent that it is an admissible official record.8  Moreover, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed may be
of some assistance in laying the foundation.8" Finally, it seems to be
accepted that someone other than the individual who made the
record may testify to lay the foundation for its admissibility.89
CONCLUSION
Under the present state of the law, to admit a document in
evidence as an official record it must be made in the regular course
of official duty, and the statements must be such that the officials or
83 Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 203, 257 P.2d 690, 699-700 (1953). The
court stated: "while the judgment may appear to be just and comparatively small,
and considerable expense might well be saved in not producing the testimony of
witnesses in respect to the foundation, the rules of evidence should not be relaxed
for these reasons alone. The statutory requirements necessary to have a writing
admitted as a business record, official record or a public writing should be met.
Otherwise, all legal barriers heretofore established by the law protecting one's right tobe confronted by witnesses and the right to cross-examination, might well vanish under
these exceptions." See also Lusardi v. Prukop, supra note 28. But see Orange County
Water District v. City of Riverside, supra note 14.
33a CAL. EviD. CODE § 1280(c).
84 People v. Byars, 188 Cal. App. 2d 794, 10 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1961).
85 Roberts v. Permanente Corp., supra note 16.
86 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1893, 1901, 1905, and 1918; CAL. EviD. CODE
§§ 1452, 1453, 1530-1532; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 186 (1954).87 Pruett v. Burr, 118 Cal. App. 2d 188, 201, 257 P.2d 690, 699 (1953).
38 Nilsson v. State Personnel Board, 25 Cal. App. 2d 699, 704, 78 P.2d 467, 469
(1938).
39 People v. Williams, 174 Cal. App. 2d 364, 345 P.2d 47 (1959); Sweet v.
Erickson, 166 Cal. App. 2d 598, 333 P.2d 369 (1958).
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employees of the public agency could testify to the same effect if
they were personally present on the witness stand. Section 1280 of
the new Evidence Code is in large part a codification of this rule, but
with the added requirement of close proximity in time. Thus, while
much of the California Evidence Code tends toward allowing greater
admissibility of evidence, section 1280 will perhaps restrict this par-
ticular exception to the hearsay rule and exclude evidence which is
now admissible.
